In a Cournot-oligopoly with free but costly entry and business stealing, output per firm is too low and the number of competitors excessive, assuming labor productivity to depend on the number of employees only or to be constant. However, a firm can raise the productivity of its workforce by paying higher wages. We show that such efficiency wages accentuate the distortions occurring in oligopoly. Specifically, excessive entry is aggravated and the welfare loss due to market power rises.
Introduction
Digitization is becoming one of the most important facets of economic life. It, for example, comprises the rise of networks and artificial intelligence as well as the evaluation of big data. These developments also affect the nature of labor as input. There are mixed findings about whether digitization will reduce or raise aggregate employment, but there is consensus that a reallocation of tasks within and across occupations has already started and will continue (see, for instance, Akerman, Gaarder, and Mogstad 2015; Dauth et al. 2017; Michaels, Natraj, and Van Reenen 2014) . One implication is that non-routine tasks are rapidly expanding, as pointed out by Dustmann, Ludsteck, and Schönberg (2009) or Autor and Dorn (2013) .
Such non-routine tasks, in particular abstract ones which are complementary to computer technology, make the effort of workers an increasingly important factor of production. In addition, they alter the observability of an individual worker's performance. On the one hand, information and communication technologies (ICT) reduce the cost of controlling effort. On the other hand, the change in a job's content implies that the importance of activities rises, for which the input of effort is basically unobservable. As pointed out by McKinsey & Company (2017) , ICT and digitization imply that workers become more critical for a firm's success and that managers have to find ways to incentivize their workforce accordingly. One way to do so is to offer a performance pay scheme, for example efficiency wages, i. e. to use wages in order to enhance a worker's productivity. 1 At the same time during which the digitization process has accelerated, markets have become less competitive (Autor et al. 2017) . Accordingly, many, if not most, product markets feature an oligopolistic structure (Head and Spencer 2017) . Therefore, this type of market and the associated welfare losses deserve special attention. Take a free entry Cournot-oligopoly as an example. In such a market, two types of inefficiencies occur: Output per firm is too low and the number of firms too high if there is business stealing. Such a business stealing effect exists if an exogenous increase in the number of competitors lowers output per firm. The inefficiency result has been derived for a variety of settings (see, inter alia, Perry 1984; Varian 1985; Mankiw and Whinston 1986; Mukherjee 2012b; Amir, De Castro, and Koutsougeras 2014) , mostly without considering specific characteristics of inputs.
This neglect may, however, affect the nature of inefficiencies and is particularly relevant with regard to the most important factor of production, i. e. labor. In a digitalized world, in which the importance of (abstract) non-routine tasks rises, firms may not only view wages as costs, but can use them more and more to improve employee productivity, as pointed out above. Higher productivity raises output per firm, possibly mitigating or eradicating the output inefficiency. Moreover, profits rise with greater productivity such that the incentive to enter the market is enhanced, suggesting that the second inefficiency, excessive entry, may be aggravated.
Model
We consider a market in which j = 1,…,n, n > 1, firms produce a homogenous consumption good. Output of firm j is denoted by and aggregate output equals = ∑ =1 . The inverse demand curve is given by ( ) = − , with p denoting the market price and q the choke price. There is Cournot-competition. Profits of firm j are:
where and denote wages and employment, respectively, and k ( > 0) market entry costs. We incorporate the notion of efficiency wages by assuming that output is an increasing function of employment and of effort e per employee. Effort, in turn, rises with the wage paid by firm j. There are a variety of approaches which rationalize the nature of such efficiency wage mechanism (cf. Schlicht 2016, for a short survey). One of the most prominent ones is the shirking model (Shapiro and Stiglitz 1984) . According to this approach, each firm in the labor market has an incentive to raise wages above the full employment level because there is imperfect information about a worker's effort. Since all firms face the same incentives, unemployment will result. In the model of dichotomous effort proposed by Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) , unemployment disciplines workers and ensures a positive effort level as well as an equilibrium in the labor market. Effort, however, does not vary incrementally with the wage. Thus, the approach has been extended to allow for a continuous choice of effort, implying that effort increases in wages (Altenburg and Straub 1998) .
While we are agnostic about the source of the effort relationship, we take up the above idea and subsequently assume that effort is costly to the worker and that these costs of effort decrease with the wage and unemployment, relative to the gain say from shirking. Consequently, the effort function e is increasing in the wage and the unemployment rate u, implying that = ( , ) and / , / > 0 hold. Moreover, we assume that effort is strictly convex in the wage, i. e. 2 / 2 < 0. This approach is compatible with a shirking model of efficiency wages and also with other underlying mechanisms, such as the exchange of gifts or a reduction in turnover. Hence, our approach commands substantial empirical relevance.
Using this specification of effort, the production function can be expressed as:
As usual in efficiency wage models, output increases in the product of employment and the measure of effort ( , ) . We therefore assume ′ ( ) > 0, with being effective labor input, = ( , ) . Output can either be concave in , i. e. ′ ( ) > 0 > ″ ( ), or linear in , implying for simplicity that ′ ( ) = 1 holds. We also consider the case of ″ ( ) > 0, but then assume that output is not too convex in ; otherwise, second-order conditions could be violated. The parameter , 0 < ≤ 1, indicates how sensitive output reacts to changes in effort. For → 0, labor productivity, ( )/ , only depends on the number of employees, or is constant if ′ ( ) = 1. This scenario can be considered as describing a world in which there are only routine tasks, or in which effort is perfectly observable such that there is no need to incentivize workers by increasing wages, i. e. there are no efficiency wages. The higher the parameter γ is, the more important effort becomes for the level of effective labor input and the more relevant is the efficiency wage mechanism.
We follow the traditional approach in the industrial organization literature and assume that the market under consideration is small, relative to the rest of the economy. This allows us to determine welfare with reference solely to this market, since repercussions on other markets are negligible. Accordingly, welfare W can be defined as the sum of consumer surplus and aggregate profits. 2 As a further consequence, also changes in wages and employment in the oligopoly we look at have (virtually) no impact on the economy-wide unemployment rate u, which is, therefore, fixed from the perspective of all oligopolists. 3 Hence, we can simplify the effort function to ( ), with ′ > 0 > ″ . Output can then be rewritten as:
Further, we assume ( ) > 1 such that / > 0, i. e efficiency wages have positive output effects. For the solution of our model, we distinguish between a free entry equilibrium and the social optimum. In the former case, firms initially enter the market as long as this is profitable.
4 Subsequently, they maximize profits with respect to employment and wages, while taking the choices of other firms as given. In the latter case, a social planner selects the number of entrants. Given this choice, all firms allowed to compete in the market set employment and wages, i. e. we consider a second-best scenario (see, inter alia, Perry 1984; Varian 1985; Mankiw and Whinston 1986; Amir, De Castro, and Koutsougeras 2014) .
Solution

Free Entry Equilibrium
Because firms are identical, we can suppress the index j. Maximizing (1) with respect to w and l yields:
This implies that in an interior solution − > 0 holds, which requires the choke price q to be sufficiently high.
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Combining (4) and (5) leads to:
where the superscript * indicates equilibrium outcomes. The equilibrium wage * is thus determined by the generalized Solow condition (6) (cf. Solow 1979 or Layard, Nickell, and Jackmann 1991) and depends on γ but not on the number of firms. Free entry implies that:
Differentiating (5) at = * , we obtain:
with = / < 0 due to the second-order conditions. Hence, our framework exhibits business stealing, i. e. an exogenous increase in the number of firms reduces output per firm. Accordingly, the pre-condition for excessive entry in a world without efficiency wages is fulfilled (Amir, De Castro, and Koutsougeras 2014) .
Given * , equilibrium employment * , output * and the number of firms * are jointly determined by the Eqs. (3), (5) and (7). A closed-form solution is, however, only possible in case of ′ = 1, i. e. if output is linear in employment. Combining (3), (5) and (7) then yields (cf. Etro 2014):
where we use the underline notation to indicate that ′ = 1 is assumed. From (10), we can further derive that the number of firms * increases in γ (for the proof, see below). Equilibrium employment follows from (3) and reads * ( ) = ( * ) − * .
To provide intuition for the outcome, note that the worker's effort rises if γ goes up. This has, ceteris paribus, an output-enhancing effect. Profits increase, which incentivizes more firms to enter the market. These firms steal business of competitors, which has, ceteris paribus, an output-reducing effect. In the case of a linear demand schedule and a linear production function, the two effects exactly offset each other, as Eq. (9) clarifies. If output per firm does not vary with γ, higher productivity will raise profits because employment declines. In consequence, more firms enter the market.
Irrespective of the curvature of the production function, profits are zero in equilibrium. Accordingly, welfare equals consumer surplus: * ( ) = * * 0 ()̃− ( * * ) * * .
(11)
Social Optimum
From (4) and (5), it can be observed that the firm's trade-off between w and l is independent of n. Accordingly, socially optimal wages and equilibrium wages coincide, i. e. = * , where the superscript opt denotes socially optimal outcomes. Output and employment, in contrast, depend on n and, therefore, on whether the number of firms is determined in market equilibrium or in a socially optimal manner.
The social planner's objective function is given by:
The first-order condition reads:
where we used (1) and (5). We assume that the second-order condition is fulfilled. 6 There is no closed-form solution for the optimal number of firms in social optimum, unless output is linear in employment. In this case ( ′ = 1), we can use the demand function to express output per firm as:
Observing (10), we obtain:
Combining (15) and (16), making use of the definition of profits and subsequently substituting in accordance with (14) and then (9), we obtain:
Using (9) and (15), we can therefore express the number of firms in social optimum for the case of a linear production function as a function of the number of firms in market equilibrium (cf. Etro 2014):
As shown in Appendix A.1, output per firm and welfare can then be calculated as:
In contrast to the market equilibrium, output per firm rises in γ in the social optimum if output is linear in employment. This is because the planner internalizes the business stealing effect and allows a lower number of new competitors into the market (relative to the equilibrium case) as γ rises. Therefore, the output-enhancing effect due to higher labor productivity dominates the output-reducing effect of fiercer competition.
Effects of Efficiency Wages
A General Result
How do efficiency wages affect oligopoly distortions? To answer this question, we focus on a rise of the parameter γ. If γ is sufficiently small, firms have no incentive to pay efficiency wages because output is (virtually) unaffected by effort. As γ increases, effort as an input factor becomes increasingly important and firms employ wages to increase productivity. 
Further Analytical Results
Next, we consider how efficiency wages affect the magnitudes of the various distortions. To obtain analytical results, we rely on the scenario with a linear production function and, thus, assume ′ = 1. In Section 4.3, we verify the robustness of the analytical findings by solving our model numerically and considering non-linear relationships between output and employment. The intuition for the results stated in Proposition 2 is as follows. If γ increases, wages and effort rise. Hence, output and profits increase. In the free entry equilibrium, more firms enter the market and steal business of incumbents. This effect is not internalized by an entrant. The output-reducing effect due to more entry exactly offsets the output-enhancing effect of higher effort. This is due to the unit elasticity of output with respect to labor and the linearity of the inverse demand curve. Consequently, the market equilibrium is characterized by an increase in * , while * remains constant.
From the social planner's perspective, the increase in effort raises the marginal gain of entry, while marginal costs k remain constant. The planner increases , taking into account that this, ceteris paribus, reduces output per firm . This implies that a) the increase in is weaker than the increase in * and b) the outputenhancing effect of higher effort dominates the output-reducing impact of higher competition, i. e. increases in γ. As the distortions due to excessive entry and insufficient output both become more pronounced, the welfare loss resulting from Cournot-competition increases. 7
Numerical Results
Quantitative Effects
To evaluate the results quantitatively for the linear production function ( ′ = 1), as illustrated in Proposition 2, we solve our model numerically. To that end, we set q = 5 (which ensures an interior solution), k = 2 (as done by Bernard, Redding, and Schott 2007) and ( ) = ( )/0.01 + 1. In order to measure the effects of efficiency wages, we compare the case of γ = 0.01 (virtually no efficiency wage) with a setting in which γ = 1 (where the production elasticities of e and l are identical).
As shown in the first column of Table 1 , the equilibrium number of firms rises by 37.6%, while the increase in the socially optimal number of firms equals 31.2%. This results in an increase of excessive entry by 45.3%. Moreover, the difference between socially optimal output per firm and the market outcome rises by 25.7%, which is driven by the fact that the latter remains constant while the former goes up. The welfare loss in the presence of efficiency wages is then 66.8% higher than in their absence, although efficiency wages on their own raise welfare because of their productivity effect. 
Non-linearities
Our analytical results summarized in Proposition 2 are based on the assumptions that (a) profits are linear in input, for a given price and (b) the price decreases linearly with aggregate output. These assumptions suffice to ensure the existence of a Cournot-equilibrium (Novshek 1985) . The first simplification is the limiting case of many seminal contributions which usually assume a convex but not necessarily a strictly convex cost function (Mankiw and Whinston 1986; Suzumura and Kiyono 1987) and has often been employed in subsequent analyses (inter alia by Amir and Burr 2015; Amir, De Castro, and Koutsougeras 2014; Marjit and Mukherjee 2013; Mukherjee 2012b) . It is generally without impact because profits will surely decrease in output or input at some production level due to the impact of each firm's output on the market price. 9 However, when comparing the extent of market inefficiencies in two different situations, the degree of the convexity of the cost function or, alternatively, of the concavity of the production function, plays a role. This is the case because the deviation of the market outcome from the socially optimal situation depends on how strongly output varies with an input adjustment. Therefore, in one of the numerical exercises below we analyze a specific production function and assume = ( ) . This implies that the marginal product of labor decreases (increases) in l if β < 1 (β > 1). 10 The second simplification, linear demand, also represents a limiting case which is usually allowed for (Mankiw and Whinston 1986; Okuno-Fujiwara and Suzumura 1993; Morita 2007a, 2007b ) and often analyzed (Amir and Burr 2015; Basak and Mukherjee 2016; Haruna and Goel 2011; Marjit and Mukherjee 2013; Mukherjee 2012b ). Frequently, the inverse demand function is supposed to be not too convex in output and to be log-concave, such that ′ ( ) + ″ ( ) ≤ 0 applies (Ara, Ghosh, and Zhang 2017; Ghosh and Saha 2007; Mizuno 2003; Matsumura and Okumura 2014) . For all these specifications, the excessive entry prediction can be derived. Since the extent of the distortions resulting from oligopoly may also depend on the curvature of the demand schedule, we consider an according generalization as well. More precisely, we specify (inverse) demand as ( ) = − 1+ . 11 Thus, the demand curve is strictly convex (concave) if α < 0 (α > 0). Moreover, it is log-concave, as ( ) = ( − ) 1/(1+ ) is decreasing in the price at an increasing rate. We subsequently consider the two generalizations in turn. As before, the impact of efficiency wages is measured by comparing outcomes in the case of γ = 0.01 with the respective values in the case of γ = 1. First, we focus on a non-linear production function and maintain the assumption of linear demand, i. e. we assume α = 0. Table 1, column 2, illustrates the case in which output is concave in employment (β = 0.8). Excessive entry rises by 61,6% and the difference between and * increases by 78,3%. The welfare loss due to oligopoly is 154% higher in the presence of efficiency wages than in their absence. Setting β = 1.2, i. e. assuming a convex relationship between employment and output (see column 3 of Table 1 ), we find that efficiency wages raise * − by 39.5% and − * by 9.6%. The increase in the welfare loss owing to oligopoly at about 37.3% is substantially lower than for a concave production function. Therefore, our analytical results are qualitatively robust with respect to variations in the marginal product of labor. Quantitatively, however, we observe sizable differences. If labor productivity increases at an increasing (decreasing) rate, the distortions and the resulting welfare loss due to oligopoly is lower (much higher) in presence of efficiency wages than in our benchmark setting with a constant marginal product of labor.
The intuition for the quantitative differences is as follows. Assuming β = 0.8 and moving from a world without efficiency wages to a framework in which they have strong productivity effects (i. e. to a setting with γ = 1) is tantamount to substituting a decreasing returns to scale technology ( + < 1) by an increasing returns to scale production function ( + > 1). In case of increasing returns, the business stealing effect is more pronounced than if there are decreasing returns to scale. This is because the use of a given amount of inputs by an entrant reduces the output of incumbents more strongly. Consequently, the difference between optimal and equilibrium output per firm is greater in the case of increasing returns. Therefore, the incentives of the social planer to limit entry are more pronounced. We can conclude that the ensuing welfare loss, because such entry restriction does not occur, is particularly pronounced if efficiency wages change the nature of the production technology.
Second, we focus on a non-linear demand function and maintain the assumption of a linear relationship between output and employment (see Table 2 ). Column 1 repeats the findings for the linear case (cf. Table 1 , column 1). Setting α = 0.2, i. e. considering a concave inverse demand curve, we observe from column 2 in Table  2 that efficiency wages increase excessive entry by 40.1% and raise the output difference − * by 15.7%. The welfare loss resulting from a Cournot-oligopoly in the presence of efficiency wages is then 57.7% higher than in their absence. If, instead, we consider a convex inverse demand curve and set = −0.2 (column 3), excessive entry increases by 52.3% and − * by 38.5% if γ rises from 0.01 to 1. The welfare loss is about 77.8% higher if firms pay efficiency wages. Comparing these findings with the baseline specification (column 1), we see that a convex (concave) demand curve slightly increases (decreases) the distortions and the ensuing welfare loss due to oligopoly when comparing a world with efficiency wages (γ = 1) with a setting in which no such productivity-enhancing mechanism exists (γ = 0.01). Therefore, our results illustrated in Proposition 2 are robust with respect to the curvature of the demand curve as well. 
Conclusion
Do efficiency wages affect the distortions in a free entry Cournot-oligopoly? To answer this question, we set up a model in which firms can raise labor productivity by increasing wages. Comparing a world in which labor productivity depends on the number of employees only or is constant on the one hand, with an efficiency wage framework, on the other, we obtain the following results.
First, efficiency wages enhance the incentives to enter the market more strongly in market equilibrium than is socially optimal. This implies that excessive entry arising in a free entry Cournot-oligopoly is aggravated. Second, efficiency wages, ceteris paribus, raise the incentives in market equilibrium to increase output per firm, while the increase in the number of competitors reduces these incentives. The net effect depends on the curvature of the demand schedule and the production function. Since it is socially optimal to restrict entry to below a level occurring in market equilibrium, the output-reducing effect of entry is smaller in the social optimum. In consequence, the difference between the socially optimal output per firm and the market outcome rises with efficiency wages. Therefore, third, the welfare loss arising due to market power is greater in the presence of efficiency wages than in their absence.
In order to relate our findings to other studies of free entry Cournot-oligopoly outcomes, we may interpret efficiency wages as a form of market imperfection. This is instructive because efficiency wages imply that firms do not take the price of inputs as given. Previous contributions focusing on imperfect input markets tend to derive conditions under which the excess entry outcome occurring in a world with competitive input market continues to hold. To illustrate the different mechanisms at work, we subsequently consider two important contributions by Ghosh and Morita (2007b) and Okuno-Fujiwara and Suzumura (1993) . Ghosh and Morita (2007b) assume that each downstream firm purchases inputs from an upstream firm and bargains with the upstream counterpart over the price and the quantity supplied by the upstream firm. The important feature of their model is that downstream firms create business for upstream firms. In a world of imperfect competition, downstream firms do not fully internalize the resulting business creation effect via the price they pay for inputs. Therefore, the business creation effect must not be too strong for the excess entry prediction to hold. OkunoFujiwara and Suzumura (1993) , in contrast, do not explicitly model an input market imperfection but assume instead that firms can reduce marginal production costs by a costly R&D investment. Hence, in their model the input price is not exogenously given, as it is in our setting. Again, under additional assumptions, the excess entry result can be shown to hold.
Our contribution differs from these -and other -previous studies in a number of conceptually important aspects. First, labor income is welfare neutral for a given output level because it lowers profits by the same amount by which consumer surplus is raised. This is in contrast to the above-mentioned studies as they are based on the assumption that lower production costs, ceteris paribus, raise welfare. One may conjecture that due to this effect the conditions for excessive entry to occur are more stringent than in a world without input market imperfections. Second, efficiency wages can be interpreted as a (relative) decline both in marginal production costs and in fixed costs. In other contributions on input market imperfections, usually only marginal costs are affected. In studies incorporating R&D investments, generally a decline in marginal costs is achieved at the expense of higher (fixed) costs, which are unrelated to the production level. Therefore, the channels by which efficiency wages affect the profit-maximizing and socially optimal decisions relating to output and entry differ from those looked at in earlier contributions on input market imperfections and R&D investments. Third, our analysis goes beyond previous investigations with regard to the comprehensiveness of predictions. We can not only show how efficiency wages affect the market outcome and the excess entry result, but additionally demonstrate that the welfare loss due to market power on the output market increases with input market imperfections.
A.1 Derivation of Eqs. (19) and (20)
Using (18), we can rewrite (15) as:
which is identical to Eq. (19). To compute (20), note that in case of a linear production function, the social planner's objective can be rewritten as:
where we have used (1), (3) and (10). Combining (23) with (22) and (9) yields,
A.2 Derivation of Proposition 2 Part (I)
Differentiating (10) with respect to γ yields:
The second derivative in square brackets can be expressed as:
Inserting ( * ( ))/ = / × * / into (26) and substituting the result into (25) yields:
Using the Solow-condition implies:
Differentiating (18) with respect to γ yields:
This shows that:
which proves the first part of Proposition 2.
A.3 Derivation of Proposition 2 Part (II)
From (9) and (19), we obtain * / = 0 and / > 0. This immediately proves the second part of Proposition 2.
A.4 Derivation of Proposition 2 Part (III)
Using (11) and (20), we can write the welfare loss as:
From (18) and (19), we find:
This leads to: 
Defining
which proves the last part of Proposition 2.
Notes
1 There is strong evidence that performance related wage schedules lead to higher effort. Lazear (2000) and Shearer (2004) find empirical support for manufacturing workers, while Lavy (2009) and Gielen, Kerkhofs, and Van Ours (2010) show a positive relationship for highskilled employees and for a representative sample of workers with different skills, respectively. 2 If effort is associated with disutility, firms pay higher wages to compensate for the loss resulting from the exertion of effort. Moreover, firms set wages such that the utility of wages minus disutility of effort is at least as high as the worker's outside option, i. e. the worker's utility of being employed elsewhere. Because this participation constraint is binding, wages and effort have no direct effect on welfare. Note that we could explicitly derive this result by introducing an outside sector with perfectly competitive markets and worker mobility. 3 Suppose instead that the unemployment u were increasing in the wage such that = ( , ( )). In this case, the basic features of our simplified effort function would survive since / = / + ( / )( / ) > 0, as long as the second derivative of effort with respect to wages, 2 / ( ) 2 , is negative. 4 We ignore the integer constraint and consider n as a continuous variable (Seade 1980). 5 Second-order conditions are given by , < 0 and | | > 0, where | | is the determinant of the Hesse-matrix. It is straightforward to show that = −2 2 + / < 0, = −2 2 + / < 0 (where we implicitly assume that in case of ″ > 0, the degree of convexity is sufficiently weak). The determinant of the Hesse-matrix reads:
Second-order conditions are thus fulfilled. 6 Differentiating (13) with respect to n yields:
where we used (4) and (5). Therefore, the second-order condition will surely be fulfilled if there is business stealing, i. e. / < 0, and / > 0 as well as 2 / 2 ≤ 0 hold. If output is linear in employment ( ′ = 1), we have / = − ( )/(1 + ) (see (16) below) and thus 2 / 2 = 2 ( )(1 − ) −2 . Replacing these terms in the second-order condition and simplifying the resulting expression yields:
which shows that the second-order condition is always fulfilled in this case. The first-order condition then implicitly defines the number of firms in the social optimum, . Intuitively, a marginal increase in n raises welfare by the amount of profits generated, but reduces welfare because of the business stealing effect, / < 0. 7 In our setting, a rise in γ reduces the wage per efficiency unit of labor /( ( ) ), as inspection of (10) and (28) clarifies, assuming that the free entry condition (7) holds. Given the linearity of output in employment, an increase in γ is, thus, tantamount to a simultaneous reduction in unit costs /( ( ) ) and the fixed costs of entry. It is straightforward to show that our findings are determined by the joint impact on both costs components as, for example, the changes in market outcome and socially optimal situation owing to a variation in entry costs can differ from those with respect to efficiency wages derived above. In Davidson and Mukherjee (2007) , it is shown that privately beneficial mergers always raise welfare because they entail savings in production costs. Our predictions indicate that this result may be sensitive to the exact way in which cost savings come about. 8 Note that higher values of market entry costs (higher than k = 2) and lower values of the choke price (higher than q = 5) aggravate the distortions. The numerical results are available upon request. 9 As an exception, Basak and Mukherjee (2016) show that if a supplier of an oligopolist has market power, the excessive entry prediction can depend on whether the production function exhibits constant or decreasing returns to scale. 10 Note that we can rewrite the production function as = ( ( ) ) = [ ( ) / ] = ( ) . Thus, the above specification is compatible with (3) and the assumption that ′ > 0 > ″ . 11 With this generalization, we can also analyze the impact of the oligopoly distortion in a world without efficiency wages. In our baseline setting with a linear demand curve, the equilibrium number of firms exceeds in this case their socially optimal number by about 83%. In addition, welfare in the social optimum is about 20% higher than welfare resulting in market equilibrium. Using the parameter values which we will introduce below in detail, excessive entry is about 10% higher (lower) if the demand curve is concave (convex) in comparison to the linear case. Similarly, the welfare loss, i. e. the difference between and * , is about 5% greater (smaller) (the detailed computation is available upon request). As such, we find that the curvature of the demand curve changes the consequences of the oligopoly distortion in a quantitative manner, while the qualitative results remain unaffected.
